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Abstract
In conflict tasks such as the Stroop, the Eriksen flanker or the Simon task, it is generally observed that the detection of
conflict in the current trial reduces the impact of conflicting information in the subsequent trial; a phenomenon termed
conflict adaptation. This higher-order cognitive control function has been assumed to be restricted to cases where conflict is
experienced consciously. In the present experiment we manipulated the awareness of conflict-inducing stimuli in a
metacontrast masking paradigm to directly test this assumption. Conflicting response tendencies were elicited either
consciously (through primes that were weakly masked) or unconsciously (strongly masked primes). We demonstrate trial-
by-trial conflict adaptation effects after conscious as well as unconscious conflict, which could not be explained by direct
stimulus/response repetitions. These findings show that unconscious information can have a longer-lasting influence on our
behavior than previously thought and further stretch the functional boundaries of unconscious cognition.
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Introduction
Masked priming studies have revealed a plethora of effects of
masked stimuli on behavior and brain activity, highlighting an
important role of unconscious information in guiding day-to-day
behavior [1,2,3]. Masked priming studies also showed that the
effects of unconscious stimuli on behavior and brain activity are of
a fleeting form. Behavioral priming effects are generally absent
when the interval between the masked prime and the target is
longer than ,500 ms [4,5,6] and neuroimaging studies showed a
rapid decay of unconsciously triggered neural activations [7], often
being absent in prefrontal cortex (PFC) [but see 8,9,10]. These
results suggest that bridging information across time cannot occur
if subjects are not aware of a stimulus [11]. On the other hand,
conscious information can be held active for long periods of time
and stored in working memory. The combination of these results
suggests that conscious information can be used strategically to
plan, guide and control future behaviors, whereas unconscious
information cannot.
This phenomenon was elegantly illustrated by Kunde [12]. In
his experiment, participants were required to perform a speeded
two-choice response to a target arrow that was preceded by a
smaller arrow, the so-called prime. Because the prime fitted within
the contour of the target, the target functioned as a (metacontrast)
mask [13,14]. Therefore, participants were not aware of the prime
when it was presented very briefly, whereas it was clearly visible
when presented slightly longer. Although a prime could not be
perceived it was still processed beyond the visual system, as
evidenced by faster response times (RTs) and fewer errors when
the prime and target were congruent than when they were
incongruent, referred to here as the correspondence effect [12].
Interestingly, the conscious experience of response conflict on trial
n–1 (previous trial) influenced cognitive control mechanisms on
trial n (current trial), in such a way that the correspondence effect
on trial n was smaller when trials were preceded by an incongruent
trial compared to a congruent trial; here referred to as conflict
adaptation.
These results are generally interpreted by assuming that,
following the detection of conflict, PFC-driven cognitive control
processes resolve conflict and increase future performance by
increasing top-down control over sensory processes [15,16,17].
However, the occurrence of specific stimulus/response repetitions
might also explain some variance in conflict tasks [18,19,20].
Crucially, in Kunde’s experiment [12], whereas conflict adapta-
tion was clearly present after the conscious experience of conflict,
it was absent when conflict-inducing stimuli were experienced
unconsciously, which suggests that conscious information process-
ing is necessary for trial-by-trial regulatory changes in cognitive
control. A lack of conflict adaptation after unconscious conflict has
also been observed by others using similar paradigms [4,21].
However, recently, we [22] and others [23] have shown that
response errors that remained unaware can induce post-error
slowing mechanisms in the subsequent trial, suggesting that
unconscious information can influence cognitive processes for
relatively long periods of time (in these cases at least ,2 seconds).
Interestingly, in EEG, we have also shown that unconscious errors
triggered increased oscillatory phase synchrony between prefrontal
and visual electrodes leading up to the next trial. Granger causality
analysis suggested that these interactions were driven mainly by
the prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that, after uncon-
scious errors, the PFC initiates a top-down biasing mechanisms
that ‘‘instructs’’ visual cortex to improve sensory performance (to
overcome future errors).
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unconsciously. In Kunde’s experiment [12] a warning sign (a
click sound) was presented before the presentation of each
prime-target pair, which predicted the upcoming stimulus that
w a sa l w a y sp r e s e n t e d7 5 0m sl a t e r .W er e a s o n e dt h a ti tm i g h t
have been possible that participants released their attention after
each trial and waited for the warning sign to reinstate their
attentional focus. Therefore, the weak neural traces elicited by
masked primes might have ‘‘died out’’ before the appearance of
the next trial. Indeed, it has been shown that top-down attention
facilitates the processing of unconscious information on the
current trial [24,25]. Furthermore, it has been proposed
recently that top-down attentional processes might improve
the ability to maintain the otherwise fleeting form of
information carried by the unconscious stimulus and that when
attention is released the ability to use this information
disappears [22,26]. Here, we slightly modified the task design
of Kunde [12] in such a way that the presentation of a prime-
target pair was not preceded by a warning sign. Additionally, we
decreased the inter-trial interval in the present experiment, now
ranging from ,1200 to ,1500 ms instead of ranging from 2050
to 2350 ms (and we did not include a neutral condition). The
combination of these factors ensured that participants had to
continue focusing on the location of the imminent stimulus
during the (short) inter-trial interval for fast and accurate
performance. Using this version of the masked priming task, we
demonstrate trial-by-trial conflict adaptation effects after
conscious as well as unconscious conflict.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
All procedures were executed in compliance with relevant laws
and institutional guidelines and were approved by the ethics
committee of the Psychology department of the University of
Amsterdam. Subjects gave written informed consent before
experimentation.
Participants
Fifty-eight volunteers participated in a battery of tests (2 h)
including the one described in the current paper (Kh) for course
credits or financial compensation. Non-overlapping results from
this dataset have been published elsewhere [27].
Design
Stimuli were presented against a white background at the centre
of a 17-inch VGA monitor (frequency 70 Hz.), which was viewed
from a distance of approximately 90 cm (each cm subtended a
visual angle of 0.64u). A blue prime arrow (width 0.96u, height
0.64u) was presented for 14 ms or 129 ms, followed by a blank
interval (29 ms), and then by a target arrow (129 ms, width 2.20u,
height 1.47u) that instructed participants to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible to its direction (Fig. 1a). Participants were
instructed to ignore the prime, which was a smaller version of the
target and fitted within the contour of the target. By manipulating
prime duration, the prime was either visible (weakly masked condition),
or its visibility was sharply reduced (strongly masked condition). Thus,
Figure 1. Experimental design and conflict adaptation results. A) Stimuli and trial timing. B) Conflict adaptation results. Correspondence
effects in trial n for RTs (mean RT on incongruent trials–mean RT on congruent trials) and error rates (mean percentage of errors on incongruent
trials–mean percentage of errors on congruent trials) as a function of prime-target correspondence in trial n-1 (congruent vs. incongruent), masking
strength in trial n (weak vs. strong masking) and masking strength in trial n-1. Conflict adaptation was significant for all possible combinations of
masking strength in trial n and masking strength in trial n-1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011508.g001
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2) weakly masked congruent trials, 3) strongly masked incongruent
trials, and 4) strongly masked congruent trials. Participants
performed four blocks, each containing 160 trials (40 per
condition, all 160 trials were shuffled randomly and subsequently
drawn sequentially from this array of trials). Total trial duration
was 1400, 1500, 1600 or 1700 ms (equal frequency). Before the
experiment participants practiced the task briefly (32 trials).
Performance feedback was presented after each block (mean RT,
SD and percentage correct on congruent/incongruent trials).
After the main task, participants performed a two-alternative
forced-choice discrimination task on the primes (80 trials; 20 trials
of each condition). Stimulus and trial timing was exactly the same
as in the main task, except that a pair of choices was presented left
and right of fixation after each trial. Participants were asked to
determine as accurately as possible whether a left-pointing or
right-pointing prime was presented in the preceding trial. Before
administrating this task, participants were told that left and right
pointing primes were presented equally frequently and were
instructed to consider this in giving their response. Accuracy was
important in this task, not the speed of responding. Upon
responding a new trial started.
Data analysis
RTs ,100 and .1000 were excluded from the analysis. Mean
RTs on correct trials and square rooted accuracy rates were
entered into an ANOVA with within-subjects’ variables of prime–
target correspondence in trial n (congruent vs. incongruent),
masking strength in trial n (weakly masked vs. strongly masked),
prime–target correspondence in trial n-1 and masking strength in
trial n-1 [see 12]. All trials following errors were excluded from the
analyses. Detection performance (percentage correct) was tested
for significance for each individual participant using a binominal
test evaluated at an alpha level of 0.05.
Results
Prime discrimination
The two-alternative forced-choice discrimination task adminis-
trated after the main task revealed that 42 out of 58 (72%)
participants were unable to perceive the strongly masked primes,
as evidenced by chance-level performance (binominal test).
Because we cannot ascertain that the other 16 participants were
truly unable to perceive the strongly masked primes consciously,
they were excluded from further analyses. For the remaining 42
participants the percentage correct for weakly masked primes was
91.8% (SD=12.6) vs. 54.8% (SD=5.7) for strongly masked
primes. Although prime discrimination was close to 50% when
strongly masked, on a group level, it was significantly above
chance-level (t(41) =5.46, p,0.001).
Conflict adaptation reflected in RTs
Mean RTs and error rates of all factorial combinations of the
included variables are presented in Table 1. Overall, participants
responded slower to incongruent than to congruent trials (main
effect of prime-target correspondence in trial n, F(1,41) =355.3;
p,0.001) and also slower after experiencing conflict in the
previous trial (main effect of prime-target correspondence trial
n-1, F(1,41) =216.8; p,0.001). Furthermore, participants
responded slower after a conscious prime in trial n-1 (main effect
of masking strength in trial n-1, F(1,41) =157.1; p,0.001) and
faster on trials with a conscious prime in trial n (main effect of
masking strength in trial n, F(1,41) =116.8; p,0.001).
As expected, the size of the correspondence effect in trial n
(mean RT on incongruent trials–mean RT on congruent trials)
was smaller when trials were preceded by an incongruent trial
than when trials were preceded by a congruent trial (interaction
prime-target correspondence in trial n and prime-target corre-
spondence trial n-1, F(1,41) =78.8; p,0.001). This demonstrates
conflict adaptation irrespective of prime awareness. Crucially,
follow-up analyses revealed significant conflict adaptation effects
for all possible combinations of masking strength in trial n-1 and
masking strength in trial n (all Fs.7.8; all ps,0.009, see Figure 1b).
This indicates that conscious, but also unconscious incongruent
primes in trial n-1 trigger conflict adaptation effects in trial n
(irrespective of whether trial n contains a conscious or unconscious
prime). However, conflict adaptation was stronger when trials
were preceded by a weakly masked prime (conscious) than by a
strongly masked prime (unconscious), as reflected in a 3-way
interaction between prime-target correspondence in trial n, prime-
target correspondence trial n-1 and masking strength in trial n-1
(F(1,41) =17.1; p,0.001). Finally, we observed a 4-way
interaction between prime-target correspondence in trial n,
prime-target correspondence trial n-1, masking strength in trial
n-1 and masking strength in trial n (F(1,41) =6.0; p=0.019),
indicating that conflict adaptation was largest when conscious
primes in trial n-1 were followed by conscious primes in trial n.
Conflict adaptation reflected in error rates
The error analyses mirrored the RT analyses reported above.
Participants made more errors on incongruent than on congruent
trials (main effect of prime-target correspondence in trial n, F(1,41)
=140.8; p,0.001). Furthermore, participants made more errors
when trial n-1 contained an unconscious prime (main effect of
masking strength in trial n-1, F(1,41) =46.4; p,0.001) and more
errors when trial n contained a conscious prime (main effect of
masking strength in trial n, F(1,41) =133.3; p,0.001). They made
less errors after experiencing conflict in the previous trial (main
effect of prime-target correspondence in trial n-1, F(1,41) =61.5;
p,0.001).
Again, the size of the correspondence effect in trial n (mean
error rate on incongruent trials–mean error rate on congruent
trials) was smaller when trials were preceded by an incongruent
trial than when trials were preceded by a congruent trial
Table 1. Mean response times (in ms) and error rates (in
percentages) as a function of masking strength in trial n and




Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent
Trial n-1 RT ER RT ER RT ER RT ER
Unconscious
Incongruent 488 4.0 454 2.6 506 28.3 397 1.9
Congruent 489 6.1 446 3.0 516 33.8 387 2.1
Conscious
Incongruent 517 1.6 504 3.0 512 12.5 445 3.0
Congruent 496 4.3 464 1.9 510 27.4 395 2.2
Note - RT, response times; ER, error rate; unconscious, strongly masked primes;
conscious, weakly masked primes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011508.t001
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target correspondence in trial n-1, F(1,41) =58.9; p,0.001).
Follow-up analyses revealed significant conflict adaptation effects
for all possible combinations of masking strength in trial n-1 and
masking strength in trial n (all Fs .4.4; all ps ,0.041, see
Figure 1b). Just as observed in RTs, conflict adaptation was
stronger when trials were preceded by a weakly masked prime
(conscious) than by a strongly masked prime (unconscious), as
reflected in a 3-way interaction between prime-target correspon-
dence in trial n, prime-target correspondence trial n-1 and masking
strength in trial n-1 (F(1,41) =9.6; p=0.004). Finally, conflict
adaptation was largest when conscious primes in trial n-1 were
followed by conscious primes in trial n as reflected in a 4-way
interaction between prime-target correspondence in trial n, prime-
target correspondence in trial n-1, masking strength in trial n-1 and
masking strength in trial n (F(1,41) =7.5; p=0.009).
Conflict adaptation and stimulus/response repetitions
It is controversial whether these conflict adaptation effects are
truly due to regulatory changes in cognitive control or whether
they reflect mere lower-level priming effects [19,28]. It has been
argued that, especially in the Eriksen Flanker task, conflict
adaptation effects might be mediated by particularly fast responses
on trials preceded by trials with the same stimulus/response
contingencies, especially evident for congruent trials following
congruent trials and incongruent trials following incongruent trials
with the same response. To test this issue, we re-analyzed the data
in such a way that in one subset of the data all trials with direct
stimulus/response repetitions were excluded (change trials), whereas
in a second subset only trials with direct stimulus/response
repetitions were included (repetition trials). The correspondence
effect for RTs and errors as a function of prime-target
correspondence in trial n-1, masking strength in trial n-1 and
masking strength in trial n and dataset (repeat versus change) is
depicted in figure 2. The conflict adaptation results were highly
similar across change and repetition trials for RTs as well as error
rates, as evidenced by the absence of significant 3-way interactions
between prime-target correspondence in trial n, prime-target
correspondence in trial n-1 and dataset for RTs (F(1,41) =2.6;
p=0.11) as well as error rate (F(1,41) =0.21; p=0.65). Although,
two-choice experiments do not allow a full-proof test against low-
level priming effects these additional analyses as well recent other
studies [e.g. 29] suggest that conflict adaptation cannot be fully
explained by low-level priming effects.
Prime visibility and adaptive control
To rule out the possibility that conflict adaptation triggered by
strongly masked primes in trial n-1 was due to incidental visibility
of the primes, we performed several additional analyses. First, we
correlated the conflict adaptation effect for all trials with an
unconscious prime in trial n-1 with detection performance
(percentage correct on strongly masked trials) across participants
to check whether both measures were related. Conflict adaptation
(RTs or error rates) did not correlate with detection performance
(all ps .0.72). Additionally, we selected the 50% (21 participants)
worst detection performers (mean percentage correct=50.1%)
and tested conflict adaptation across these ‘‘poor detectors’’. For
this group, conflict adaptation effects were highly similar
Figure 2. Conflict adaptation results for repeat and change trials separately. Correspondence effects in trial n for RTs (mean RT on
incongruent trials–mean RT on congruent trials) and error rates (mean percentage of errors on incongruent trials–mean percentage of errors on
congruent trials) as a function of prime-target correspondence in trial n-1 (congruent vs. incongruent), masking strength in trial n-1 (weak vs. strong
masking), and masking strength in trial n. Correspondence effects are reported for a dataset containing trials without stimulus/response repetitions
(change trials) and trials with stimulus/response repetitions only (repetition trials).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011508.g002
Unconscious Conflict
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trials preceded by strongly masked (unconscious) primes were still
significant for RTs (prime n conscious: F(1,20) =5.5, p=0.030;
prime n unconscious: F(1,20) =4.5, p=0.047) and error rates
(prime n conscious: F(1,20) =5.4, p=0.031; prime n unconscious:
F(1,20) =3.3, p=0.085). Also, conflict adaptation after conscious
(weakly masked) primes remained significant for RTs and error
rates irrespective of masking strength in trial n (all ps,0.028).
These results further suggest that conflict adaptation effects
(observed in trial n) can be induced by strongly masked primes
(in trial n-1) that cannot be perceived consciously.
Discussion
We report that unconsciously induced conflict can elicit conflict
adaptation in the next trial. In a masked priming experiment, we
focused on behavioral adaptations following conflict resulting from
incongruent trials compared to behavioral adaptations after trials
on which no conflict was experienced (congruent trials). Conflict-
ing response tendencies were elicited either consciously (weakly
masked primes) or unconsciously (strongly masked primes). We
replicated the standard conflict adaptation effect for conscious
conflict; the correspondence effect in trial n was sharply reduced
after incongruent compared to congruent trials in trial n-1 (for
response times as well as error rates). Crucially, conflict adaptation
was also present after unconsciously induced conflict. These
findings suggest that participants engender a more cautious
response strategy and increase cognitive control after the
experience of conscious, but also unconscious conflict-inducing
stimuli.
Generally, conflict adaptation is interpreted by assuming that,
following conflict, cognitive control processes subserved by the
PFC resolve conflict and increase future performance by
increasing top-down control over perceptual processes
[15,16,17]. However, it has also been argued that correspondence
effects can be explained fully by low-level repetition priming effects
[18,19]. Although repetition priming has been shown to explain
variance on some occasions [19,20], the present as well as several
previous results could not be explained by simple stimulus/
response repetitions across trials [e.g. 16,29,30].
Interestingly, using a similar design, Kunde [12] did not observe
conflict adaptation after unconscious conflict [see also 4,21,29].
The crucial difference between his design and ours is the omission
of a warning sign before stimulus presentation along with shorter
trial durations in the present experiment. It might be that these
two manipulations ensured that participants remained their
attentional focus in between trials, instead of releasing their
attention up until the presentation of the warning sign. Since it has
been shown recently that (spatial and temporal) attention can be
directed towards unconscious stimuli and that doing so increases
the impact of these stimuli on subsequent behavior [24,25], we
hypothesize that, in line with others [26], such relatively long-term
effects of unconscious information might be due to top-down
attentional facilitation of the weak neural traces elicited by the
unconscious primes. Future work is required to test this hypothesis
more systematically.
Although speculative since we did not obtain any neural
measures here, recent studies did observe relatively long-lasting
neural activations elicited by masked (unconscious) words in a
masked priming paradigm, up to approximately one second
[26,31]. Even longer effects of unconscious priming (up to several
minutes) have been reported, for example in ‘‘mere exposure’’
paradigms [32,33]. In combination, these results suggests that
unconscious stimuli can influence cognitive processes for longer
periods of time than previously thought, which has direct
implications for theoretical models that propose a rapid decay of
unconscious neural traces [34,35,36]. Future studies are necessary
to further specify the temporal limitations of unconscious
information processing, for example by systematically varying
the inter-trial interval in a masked priming experiment.
In sum, we show that unconsciously experienced conflict-
inducing stimuli can trigger conflict adaptation (under specific
conditions). These results add to the growing body of literature
suggesting that unconscious information can influence high-level
(prefrontal) cognitive control functions, such as inhibitory control
[9,10], task switching [8], error correction [22,23] and conflict
adaptation (present study). These results further elucidate and
expand the potential influence of unconscious information on our
direct, but also future decisions.
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